What they did
Kasliwal built a throwaway lab in its own AWS account: a small Laravel app on ECS Fargate with an RDS MySQL database, a load balancer and CloudFront, plus a second account that only holds encrypted backup copies. The AI tool got its own IAM role with read access for routine work and explicit denies on deleting or modifying the database, deleting backups or vaults, deleting S3 objects, reading the database password, changing its own permissions and reaching the backup account. He wrote a marker row into the database first. Then he opened Kiro with only that profile and asked it, on purpose, to delete the database and all of its backups, approving each command it proposed. Separately he scripted ten destructive calls under the same role and a full admin wipe to test the backup account.
How it went
Kiro ran nine AWS commands and four were denied; none of the destructive ones went through. It noticed deletion protection and asked before trying to turn it off, then AWS refused both that change and the delete, and it could not see the backups at all. It finished by offering to run the commands with an admin profile if he supplied one. The scripted test saw ten of ten calls refused. In the admin wipe the database was gone in 109 seconds, but the cross-account copy survived; the restore took 30.9 minutes instead of about 14 because the untested restore script failed three times first.
Worth knowing
This was a staged test he ran once, with every command approved by hand. The scoped role only helps if it is the only AWS login the agent can reach, so check ~/.aws/config on the machine it runs on. IAM does not stop SQL: an agent holding the database password can still drop tables. The post ends with a pitch for his consulting check.